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OBSERVATIONS ON SOME PENNSYLVANIA
COMMUNITY PROPERTY PROBLEMS
By CUTHBERT H. LATTA t AND KENNETH W. GEMMILL $
I
INTRODUCTION
On July 7, 1947, the Governor of Pennsylvania signed Senate
Bill No. 615 ' and thereupon Pennsylvania became the thirteenth com-
munity property state.2 As the origin of the community property
system is known in a general way to all lawyers and has frequently been
told,' it will not be discussed here. So far as the origin of the Penn-
sylvania statute is concerned, a comparison of it with the Oklahoma
Community Property Act of 1945 ' leaves little room for doubt that
the former is "based upon" the latter. The Pennsylvania Act consists
of sixteen sections. Nine of these were copied verbatim from the
Oklahoma Act,5 while six were copied with minor changes in phrase-
ology required by differences in local terminology and practice.6 The
remaining section, being the repealer, necessarily differs somewhat
from its counterpart in the Oklahoma statute.7 In the face of this, it
is hard to believe that the Pennsylvania legislature did much more than
read and adopt the Oklahoma statute. It remains to be seen whether
a virtually untested statute, such as that of Oklahoma,' makes a good
model. But this much is clear: that the Oklahoma statute, when
placed on top of the statutory and common law of Pennsylvania,
creates problems. The purpose of this article is to discuss a few of
them.
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1. Act of July 7, 1947, No. 550; effective September 1, 1947.
2. The other states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.
3. DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY C. I, II (1943) ; McKAY,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY C. 1-3 (2d ed. 1925).
4. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 66-82 (Supp. 1946).
5. Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13 of the Pennsylvania Act are the same as
the sections numbered correspondingly in the Oklahoma Act.
6. E. g., in sections 5 and 15 of the Pennsylvania Act the word "real estate" was
substituted for the word "homestead" in the corresponding sections of the Oklahoma
Act. Despite the fact that the term homestead makes no sense in Pennsylvania law,
it appeared in the bill as introduced in the Pennsylvania Senate. The nonsense was
emended from Section 5 on third reading in the Senate; but in Section 15 it apparently
went unnoticed until after final passage in the Senate and second reading in the House.
7. Section 16 of the Pennsylvania Act contains a blanket repealer of prior incon-
sistent laws, whereas section 16 of the Oklahoma Act reads: "Sections 51 to 65 inc.,
Tit. 32, Oklahoma Statutes 1941, are hereby repealed."
8. Apparently there are no reported cases involving the Oklahoma Act.
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The motives that prompted the Pennsylvania legislature to adopt
the community property system are slightly less ideological than those
that are said to have led the Visigoths to devise it.9 It is no secret
that the purpose of the Pennsylvania Act is simply to afford relief from
high federal income taxes.'0 The way in which the community prop-
erty system provides tax relief is quite simple. Under the system the
income of a husband and his wife is divisible between them in halves;
each then reports one-half of the total income in a separate return and
pays tax on it; and a saving results from the fact that, with a graduated
scale of tax rates, two people each having say $5,000 of income pay less
tax than one person with $10,000.1
In general the maximum tax saving results only when all of
the taxable income of both husband and wife is split evenly. If some,
but not all, of their taxable income is split, the maximum tax saving
will not be achieved; indeed, in some cases a partial splitting will in-
crease taxes.' 2 We mention this because it has an important bearing
on the interpretation of certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Act.
It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that doubtful words of
an act should be interpreted so that the act will hit the mark at which
it is aimed. 3 Here the Act is aimed at reducing federal income taxes.
The degree of its success will depend upon the degree to which it
9. DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 10, 11 (1943).
10. In approving Senate Bill No. 615 Governor Duff issued a statement reading
in part as follows (History of Senate Bills, Session of 1947, p. 122) :
"The purpose of the recent legislation is primarily to effect savings on Fed-
eral Income Tax. I have been advised that the minimum savings to taxpayers of
Pennsylvania under this bill will be $100,000,000 a year. This is a consideration
that cannot possibly be overlooked.
"I am not unaware that such a radical change in the law of Pennsylvania
will cause some confusion and will be the cause of considerable litigation; but the
fact that $100,000,000 will be saved to the taxpayers of the Commonwealth is such
a vast amount of money, particularly at a time the taxes are generally so onerous,
that I believe that it is in the interest of the people of the Commonwealth to ap-
prove the bill and run the risk of the confusion that will be caused by the new
legislation."
11. At current tax rates, splitting an income in half will produce a tax saving of
$38 on a net income (before exemptions) of $5,000, a saving of $342 on a net income
of $10,000, a saving of $893 on a net income of $15,000, and a saving of $1,700 on a
net income of $20,000.
12. For example, if the husband has a $10,000 salary-which is clearly community
property-and the wife has $20,000 of income from investments, there will be a tax
saving only if the wife's investment income is treated as community property. If that
is done, the total family income of $30,000 will be split in half, each will pay a tax of
$4,270 on $15,000, the total of the two taxes will be $8,540, and this will be $451 less
than if the husband had paid tax on his $10,000 salary and the wife had paid tax on
her $20,000 of investment income. On the other hand, if the husband's salary is
treated as community property but the wife's investment income is treated as separate
property, then only the salary will be split, the husband will pay a tax of $921 on
$5,000, the wife will pay a tax of $9,363 on $25,000 (i. e., all of her investment income
plus one-half of her husband's salary), and the total of the two taxes will be $1,292
greater than under the regime of separate property.
13. Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, art. IV,
§ 51, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551 (Purdon, 1938) ; Commonwealth v. Chalfant, 352
Pa. 193, 42 A. 2d 587 (1945); Swartley v. Harris, 351 Pa. 116, 40 A. 2d 409 (1945).
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divides the taxable income of husbands and wives. Therefore, in cases
where it is doubtful whether items of income should be treated as com-
munity property or as separate property, the doubt should be resolved
in favor of treating them as belonging to the community.
The specifications for a community property system that will pro-
duce income tax savings were laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in Poe v. Seaborn 4 and Commissioner v. Harmon.5  After
the passage of the Pennsylvania Act the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, in reply to a request of the Bank and Trust Company Tax
Association of Philadelphia, ruled that the Act meets the specifica-
tions. 6 Thus the Act has taken its first step successfully.
II
INCOME FROM SEPARATE PROPERTY
A. In General
The first question to be considered is whether income from sepa-
rate property is separate or community. The question arises because
the Pennsylvania Act fails to cover the point specifically; and it is
worth considering in some detail not only because it is important in
itself but also because it bears on the question whether trust income is
separate or community.'
7
The pertinent provisions of the Pennsylvania Act are in the first
four sections. Section 1 provides:
"All property of the husband, both real and personal, owned
or claimed by him before marriage or before the effective date of
this act, whichever is later, and that acquired afterwards by gift,
devise, or descent or received as compensation for personal in-
juries, shall be his separate property."
Section 2 defines the wife's separate property in the same way. Sec-
tion 3 provides that all property acquired by either the husband or the
wife during the existence of the community, "except that which is
the separate property of either as hereinabove defined," shall be com-
14. 282 U. S. 101 (1930).
15. 323 U. S. 44 (1944).
16. The ruling dated August 27, 1947, reads in part:
"Upon examination of the provisions of the Pennsylvania Community Prop-
erty Act, approved July 7, 1947, and effective September 1, 1947 (Pa. Senate Bill
No. 615, 1947 Session), it is the opinion of this office that said Act establishes a
community property system which, for Federal income tax purposes, satisfies the
test prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Poe v. Seaborn, 282
U. S. 101, Ct. D. 259, C. B. IX-2, 202 (1930) and Commissioner v. Harmon (323
U. S. 44, Ct. D. 1616, C. B. 1944, 166).
"In view of the foregoing, it is held that a husband and wife who are domiciled
in the State of Pennsylvania are entitled to include in their separate Federal in-
come tax returns one-half of their community income received and accrued on
and after September 1, 1947, the effective date of the Pennsylvania Community
Property Act."
17. Infra pp. 26-29.
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munity property. Since income from separate property is not specifi-
cally mentioned in the definitions of separate property contained in
Sections 1 and 2, on the surface it would appear to fall within the
catch-all definition of community property contained in Section 3.
Implied confirmation of this is supplied by Section 4: it says that the
"wife shall have the management and control and may dispose of...
that portion of the common or 'community property consisting of...
all rents, interest, dividends, and other income from her separate
property." However, despite this implication some lawyers doubt
whether income from separate property belongs to the community, and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has gone so far as to rule that
it does not.18 Probably the chief cause of the doubt is that the Su-
preme Court of California disagrees with the Supreme Court of Texas
on the interpretation of substantially the same words as are used
in the definitions of separate property contained in Sections 1 and 2
of the Pennsylvania Act. In George v. Ransom '9 the California court
held that the words require that income from separate property be
treated as separate property, whereas in Arnold v. Leonard 2 the Texas
court held that the words require no such thing and that income from
separate property belongs to the community. The decisions are irrec-
oncilable, and therefore the -only course is to look elsewhere for clues
to the meaning of the Pennsylvania Act.
A survey of the community property statutes in force when the
Pennsylvania Act was pending in the legislature indicates quite clearly
that the framers of the Act must have expected, as Section 4 implies,
that income from separate property would be community property. At
that time there were nine community property states. In seven of
them the question whether income from separate property is separate
or community was expressly covered by statute.21 California was one
18. As to the lawyer's doubt see FIDUCIARY REVIEv (Girard Trust Co., Philadel-
phia), Aug. 1947, pp. 3-4. The ruling is dated September 4, 1947, and reads in part:
"Under the Pennsylvania Community Property Act (sections 1 and 2) the
separately owned property, both real and personal, owned or claimed by either
spouse before marriage or before the effective date of the Act, whichever is later,
and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent or received as compensa-
tion for personal injuries, remains the separate property of the respective spouse.
Thus, for Federal income tax purposes, the income received after September 1,
1947, from separate investments of the spouses is the separate income of and is
taxable to the spouse who owns the investments."
19. 15 Cal. 322 (1860) ; accord, Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 620, 145 P. 2d 312,
316 (1944).
20. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925) ; followed, Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61,
36 S. W. 2d 152 (1931).
21. Income from separate property expressly made separate property: ARiz. CODE
§§ 63-302 (1939) ; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 162-3 (1941) ; NEv. ComP. LAWS § 3355 (1929) ;
N. M. ANN. ST. §§ 68-302, 303 (1929); WASH. REV. STAT. § 6891-2 (Remington,
1932). Income from separate property expressly made community property: IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 31-907 (1932). Subject to qualifications, income from separate property
expressly made community property: LA. CIv. CODE art. 2386 (1932).
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of the seven: its code provided, as it still does, that "the rents, issues,
and profits" of separate property shall be separate property." The
only two states whose statutes were silent on the point were Oklahoma
and Texas.23 Apparently the rule in Oklahoma is the same as that
in Texas, i. e. that income from separate property belongs to the com-
munity.2 4  In view of this background, it seems clear that the Penn-
sylvania legislature, when it aligned itself with Oklahoma and Texas
by omitting a specific reference to income from separate property, must
have intended to adopt the rule prevailing in those states. Surely if
it had intended to adopt California's rule, it would have followed Cali-
fornia's example by specifically stating that "the rents, issues, and
profits" of separate property shall be separate property.25
If, despite the historical background of the Act and the implication
of Section 4, it is regarded as doubtful whether income from separate
property is community 'property, then the doubt should be resolved in
favor of treating it as community property simply because that treat-
ment will result in the greatest amount of income tax relief.26 Unless
this is done, many Pennsylvania couples will get no relief under the
Act and some will have their taxes increased as a result of it.
2
It has been suggested that the Act should be interpreted as treat-
ing income from separate property as separate property in order to
avoid constitutional doubts.2' The objection to this is that it would
result in an unnecessary loss of income tax relief in cases not affected
by the constitutional doubts. 9 If these doubts must be reckoned with,
it would seem that a better way of avoiding them is to construe the
Act so that income from separate property will be community property
and to restrict the Act's application to cases where the separate prop-
erty is acquired after the effective date of the Act or where the marriage
occurs after that date."° This could be done under the well-settled rule
that the application of a statute may be restricted to part of the field
it was intended to cover if it would be unconstitutional as applied to
the balance. 3
22. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 162-3 (1941).
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 32, §§ 66-67; Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. arts. 4613-4 (1936).
24. Cf. Harmon v. Oklahoma, 189 Okla. 475, 118 P. 2d 205 (1941).
25. Cf. Commonwealth v. One Cadillac, 158 Pa. Super. 392, 397, 45 A. 2d 406
(1946).
26. Supra note 13 and discussion pertaining thereto.
27. Supra note 12 and discussion pertaining thereto.
28. FIDUCIARY REVIEW (Girard Trust Co., Philadelphia), Aug. 1947, pp. 3-4.
29. Supra note 12.
30. This construction will require an apportionment of income between capital ex-
isting at the start of the community and personal service in partnerships and individual
proprietorships. See note 89 infra.
31. Dahnke-Walter Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 289 (1921) ; Kansas City Ry.
Co. v. Anderson, 233 U. S. 325, 329-30 (1914) ; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270,
295 (1884) ; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849) ; Cornell v. Beaver County,
3 Pa. Dist. 783 (C. P. Beaver Co. 1894) ; 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
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Accordingly, it would seem that the Act can and should be inter-
preted as establishing for Pennsylvania the same rule that was laid
down for Texas in Arnold v. Leonard 3 -- that income from separate
property belongs to the community.
B. Meaning of Income
Before leaving this subject, it may be well to refer to the question
of how receipts from separate property should be allocated to principal
(separate property) and income (community property). It has been
suggested 33 that Pennsylvania's new Principal and Income Act 3 may
govern the question by analogy. It would appear, however, that resort
to that Act may lead to trouble.
For example, suppose that after September 1, 1947, a wife receives
shares of corporate stock by gift and that a short time later, before any
earnings are accumulated and before any change in the intrinsic value
of the stock, the corporation declares a dividend payable in shares of its
own stock of a different rank. It is clear that the original shares,
having been acquired by the wife through a gift, are her separate
property. If the usual rule of community property law is applied,
the declaration of the dividend would be regarded as merely changing
the form of the separate property and the new shares received would
remain separate property." If, on the other hand, the Principal and
Income Act is applied by analogy, then under Section 5 (1) the divi-
dend would be regarded as income; and since income from separate
property belongs to the community, the dividend would be allocated
to the community.
Similar difficulties will arise if receipts from natural resources
are allocated by analogy to the Principal and Income Act. Thus, sup-
pose that after September 1, 1947, a wife receives land by gift and
366-7 (8th ed. 1927). This is not the type of problem that can be solved by the doc-
trine of severability: there is no part of the definition sections that can be discarded
without interfering with the Act's prospective application. Cf. Baldwin v. Franks,
120 U. S. 678, 685-6 (1887).
32. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
33. Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, p. 221, col. 4, Aug. 28, 1947.
34. Act of July 3, 1947, No. 516, effective July 3, 1947. The point being discussed
is obviously outside the scope of the Act, which is defined by Section 2 as "the ascer-
tainment of income and principal, and the apportionment of receipts and expenses
between tenants and remaindermen, in all cases where a principal has been established."
35. E. g., Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F. 2d 631 (C. C. A. 5th 1942); 1 DE FUNIAX,
PRINCIPLES OF CUMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 77, p. 205. Section 4 of the Pennsylvania
Community Property Act lends itself to the argument that all stock dividends are
community, since the section implies that "all rents, interest, dividends, and other
income" from the wife's separate property belong to the community; but the argument
could hardly be regarded as sound. Cf. Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144, 153, 73 At. 320,
323 (1909) ; holding that "the settlor meant to indicate by the use of the three words,
'dividends,' 'income,' and 'profits' . . . everything in the way of advantage or ben-
efit which might accrue from the stock, without decreasing the original value of the
capital which it represented"; accord, Bard's Estate, 339 Pa. 433, 437-8, 13 A. 2d 711,
713 (1940).
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then enters into a coal lease by which she sells the coal for a royalty on
each ton of coal as removed. In effect this is simply a sale of part
of the wife's separate property.36  Under community property prin-
ciples, the proceeds of the sale (i. e. the royalties) would be principal
and therefore separate property.3 7 But under Section 9 of the Principal
and Income Act only two-thirds would be treated as principal and
hence separate property; the remaining one-third would be treated as
income and hence community property.
It may be doubted whether fundamental rules of community
property law may be thus upset by analogy based on a statute designed
to cover an entirely different subject, particularly when the result may
be to dissipate separate property. The better course would be to say
that only'those items that fall within the common law definition of
income may be treated as income from separate property and therefore
allocable to the community.
III
TRUST INCOME
A. In General
To take the problem in a simple form, suppose that after Septem-
ber 1, 1947, a Pennsylvania resident dies leaving a will by which he
places his estate in trust to pay the income to his married daughter,
also a Pennsylvania resident, until her death, and then to pay the
principal to others. Will the income, when paid to the daughter, be her
separate property or will it belong to the community? The answer
depends on whether the income falls within the definition of separate
property contained in Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Act; if it does not,
then under Section 3 it is community property. It will be recalled
that Section 2 divides the wife's separate property into three classes:
(1) property owned or claimed by the wife before marriage or before
September 1, 1947, (2) property "acquired afterwards by gift, devise
or descent," and (3) property received as compensation for personal
injuries.3  By definition the daughter's income falls outside the first
and third classes. What about the second? Probably the most natural
first reaction is to say that the daughter's income is acquired by gift
and hence is her separate property. However, the available cases point
the other way.
36. E. g., Marshall v. Mellon, 179 Pa. 371, 375, 36 Atl. 201 (1897).
37. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray, 159 F. 2d 834, 842 (C. C. A. 5th
1947); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson, 76 F. 2d 766, 770 (C. C. A. 5th
1935); State v. Hatcher, 115 Tex. 332, 281 S. W. 192 (1926) ; Stephens v. Stephens,
292 S. W. 290 (Tex. 1927).
38. Supra p. 22.
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Apparently most, if not all, of the reported cases dealing directly
with the problem originated in Texas; and all but a few are tax cases
that ended in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
first of these is Commissioner v. Terry.9 There it was held that
income received by a Texas wife as life beneficiary of a trust under a
New York will was community property and therefore divisible and
taxable to the wife and her husband by halves. This result was reached
by blending the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Arnold v. Leon-
ard 4  with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Irwin v.
Gavit.4" It will be recalled that Arnold v. Leonard establishes the rule
that in Texas income from separate property belongs to the community.
Irwin v. Gavit, on the other hand, stands for the principle that a life
beneficiary of a trust is the equitable owner of the trust res.4' The
result of the synthesis is this:
1. When an equitable life estate is created by gift, the beneficiary
becomes the equitable owner of the trust res;
2. Since by the gift the beneficiary acquires the trust res and
since property thus acquired is separate, it follows that the
trust res is the beneficiary's separate property;
3. Since the income distributed to the beneficiary comes from the
trust res, which is the beneficiary's separate property, and since
under Arnold v. Leonard income from separate property be-
longs to the community, it follows that trust income is com-
munity property.
This is the line of reasoning that underlies Commissioner v. Terry and
a series of cases that followed it."
It would appear that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit correctly appraised the result of blending Arnold v. Leonard
39. 69 F. 2d 969 (C. C. A. 5th 1934).
40. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
41. 268 U. S. 161 (1925).
42. This is not the primary ground on which Irwin v. Gavit rests. The taxpayer's
argument was that the statute defined taxable income as including "gains or profits
and income derived from any source whatever, including the income from but not the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent," and therefore that the
trust income, having been acquired by bequest, was exempt from tax. The primary
ground on which the case was decided is that even if the income-was acquired by be-
quest, still it did not come within the exemption because the exemption was intended
to apply only to gifts of principal and not to gifts of income. Id. at 167. However,
the court (Holmes, J.) pointed out, as an alternative ground for the decision, that in
fact the income was not acquired by gift: where an equitable life estate is created, what
the beneficiary acquires is, not the income, but rather the equitable ownership of the
trust res. (Id. at 167-8.)
43. Commissioner v. Wilson, 7.6 F. 2d 766 (C. C. A. 5th 1935) ; Commissioner
v. Porter, 148 F. 2d 566 (C. C. A. 5th 1945) ; Commissioner v. Snowden, 148 F. 2d
569 (C. C. A. 5th 1945) ; McFaddin v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 570 (C. C. A. 5th
1945) ; Commissioner v. Sims, 148 F. 2d 574 (C. C. A. 5th 1945) ; Eva Lavino Grif-
fiths, 30 B. T. A. 852 (1934) ; accord, Ernestine Mitchell, 38 B. T. A. 1336 (1938).
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with Irwin v. Gavit. Therefore, if the ingredients of the blend are part
of the law of Pennsylvania, on principle the line of cases headed by
Commissioner v. Terry should be followed in Pennsylvania. For rea-
sons stated above, the rule of Arnold v. Leonard ought to be applied in
Pennsylvania.44 So far as the concept underlying Irwin v. Gavit is
concerned, there can be no doubt that it is the law of Pennslyvania. In
Commonwealth v. Stewart,45 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held:
".. . the modern trend of equity jurisprudence has inclined
toward the doctrine that, in addition to rights against the trustee,
the beneficiary also has rights in rem, an actual property interest
in the subject-matter of the trust, an equitable ownership of the
trust res.
"... In Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 167, the court said: 'The
courts below went on the ground that the gift to the plaintiff was
a bequest and carried no interest in the corpus of the fund. We do
not regard those considerations as conclusive, . . . but if it were
material a gift of the income of a fund ordinarily is treated by
equity as creating an interest in the fund. Apart from technicali-
ties we can perceive no distinction relevant to the question before
us between a gift of the fund for life and a gift of the income from
it. The fund is appropriated to the production of the same
result whichever form the gift takes ..
"Without undertaking to collate authorities from state jurisdic-
tions, we have in our own state some indication that Pennsylvania
is in accord with these views ...
"The fact that appellee [the beneficiary] has only a right to the
income from the trust for life, and not a greater interest, as, for
example, an estate in remainder or a power of appointment of the
corpus, obviously goes merely to the quantum of her equitable
estate in the trust res and not to the existence of such an estate." 46
Accordingly, it is likely that the rule of Commissioner v. Terry-that
trust income belongs to the community-will be the Pennsylvania rule.
Apparently the only reported decision of a Texas court on the sub-
ject is McClelland v. McClelland.' There a husband domiciled in
Texas had a life estate in a trust under his father's will. The will gave
him $150 a month for his support and maintenance and authorized the
executors to make such advances, in addition to the monthly sums, out
of the estate as they might think proper. The husband and wife were
divorced and thus it became necessary to divide their community
44. Supra pp. 23-25.
45. 338 Pa. 9, 12 A. 2d 444 (1940).
46. Id. at 14-15, 12 A. 2d at 447. To the same effect see Jones v. Jones, 344 Pa.
310, 25 A. 2d 327 (1942). Compare Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui
Que Trust, 17 COL. L. REv. 269 (1917), with Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the
Cestui Que Trust, 17 COL. L. REv. 467 (1917).
47. 37 S. W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
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property. At the time there was a substantial amount of income
accumulated in the hands of the executors, and the wife claimed that
this was payable to the husband and was community property. The
court held that under the will the husband could not force the trustees
to advance the accumulations to him, that his wife's rights were no
greater than his, and therefore that the accumulations did not belong
either to the husband or to the community. In addition the wife
claimed that the income actually distributed to the husband was com-
munity property and should be accounted for as such. The court also
rejected this contention, and in so doing said:
"In this connection we will take occasion to say that the wife is
not entitled to any interest in the amounts received by the appellant
McClelland [the husband] from the executors, because these
amounts were his separate property, devised to him by the will,
in which the wife had no community interest." 48
This appears to be a clear holding that trust income is property acquired
by gift or devise and hence does not belong to the community. In
Commissioner v. Porter,49 an effort was made to distinguish this case
on the basis that it "dealt not with income which had been paid over to
the beneficiary but with a claim to income still held in the trust," 50 but
this distinction is not supported by the facts of the case. 1 Perhaps the
case could be distinguished on the ground that under the will the
monthly payments to the husband were earmarked for his support and
maintenance and hence the trust was a separate use trust.52  In any
event, the case conflicts with the concept that the beneficiary of a trust
is the equitable owner of the trust res and hence the res, and not the
income from it, is the property that he acquires by gift; and since this
concept has already been adopted in Pennsylvania, it would seem that
the McClelland case should not be followed.
It might be suggested that constitutional difficulties will arise if
the Pennsylvania Act is interpreted as treating trust income as com-
munity property and that these difficulties should be avoided by inter-
preting it so that trust income will be separate property. For reasons
explained above, 3 the better way of avoiding the possible difficulties
would be to interpret the Act as treating trust income as community
property and to restrict its application to cases where the trust is
created or the marriage occurs after September 1, 1947. This method
48. Id. at 359.
49. 148 F. 2d 566 (C. C. A. 5th 1945).
50. Id. at 568.
51. 37 S. W. at 357.
52. Infra p. 30.
53. Supra p. 24.
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will avoid the constitutional difficulties just as effectively as the other
and will afford greater tax savings.
B. Spendthrift Trusts
A word about spendthrift trusts may be appropriate. In Com-
missioner v. Porter " it was held that income received by Texas bene-
ficiaries from a spendthrift trust is community property. The theory
of this is that "as long as the income was in the hands of the trustees
and undistributed it was protected, but as soon as it was paid over it
passed to the daughters [the beneficiaries] as their property, freely
and completely alienable, and as fully subject as any other unrestricted
property of theirs to the ordinary impact of the law." " This appears
to be entirely sound."
C. Separate Use Trust
Another type of trust that should not be overlooked is the sepa-
rate use trust. In Hutchinson v. Mitchell " it was decided that the law
of Texas permits a separate use trust for a married woman and that
"the separate equitable estate of the wife is fully recognized and the
rules of the common law apply to it," 58 with the result that the trust
income does not belong to the community. This case has been criti-
cized "as a decision of the Semicolon or Carpet Bag Court of Texas
and therefore not authoritative."59  However, substantially the same
result was reached in Sullivan v. Skinner," which involved a legal
rather than equitable life estate. In Commissioner v. Porter,6 the
court referred to the question but refrained from passing upon it, since
the trust instrument there involved did not express an intent to create
a separate use trust. In view of the fact that the law of Pennsylvania,
like the law of Texas, allows wide latitude in the imposition of condi-
tions on gifts, it is reasonable to suppose that the Pennsylvania courts
would hold that income from a separate use trust does not belong to
the community. Accordingly, in any case where a settlor or testator
wishes to make certain that the beneficiary's spouse will not have any
interest, a separate use trust should be considered. 2
54. 148 F. 2d 566 (C. C. A. 5th 1945).
55. Id. at 568.
56. C . GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 370 (2d ed. 1947); Provident Trust
Co. v. Gordon, 41 Pa. D. & C. 188 (1941).
57. 39 Tex. 487 (1873).
58. Id. at 493.
59. Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F. 2d 566, 568 (C. C. A. 5th 1945).
60. 66 S. W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
61. 148 F. 2d 566 (C. C. A. 5th 1945).
62. It should be borne in mind that in Pennsylvania "a separate use can only be
created for the benefit of a woman actually married, or in immediate contemplation
of marriage; and although effectual as respects the first marriage, it will not revive
for her protection under a second marriage": Quin's Estate, 144 Pa. 444, 453, 22 Atl.
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IV
CAPITAL GAINS ON SALE OF SEPARATE PROPERTY
A. In General
The next problem to be considered can best be explained by illus-
tration. Suppose that a man buys stock in a company by which he is
not employed, that he pays $1,000 for it, that later he marries at a
time when it is worth $1,200, and that while still married he sells it
for $1,500. Since the husband was not employed by the company, it
is obvious that community effort did not contribute to the $500 gain
realized on the sale of the stock. Does any part of the gain belong to
the community, or is all of it the husband's separate property?
The Pennsylvania Community Property Act contains no reference
whatever to increases in the value of property. Section 3, however,
does mention gains: it provides that "all the effects which the husband
and wife possess at the time the marriage may be dissolved shall be
regarded as common effects or gains unless the contrary be satisfac-
torily proved". This reference to gains is of no real help in solving
the problem under consideration; for it will be noticed that the Act
does not say that "gains" shall be community property but rather that
"effects" shall be regarded as common effects or gains. There is
nothing to indicate that the word "effects" was intended to refer to
"gains", and consequently a statement that effects shall be treated as
community property throws no light on the question whether gains
should be treated as community property. Since the Act throws no
light on this problem, the rule applied in other states will be examined
to aid in its solution.
B. The Authorities
A typical statement of the general rule is that "capital gains from
the sale of separate property are everywhere separate property." 6"
The California courts held in McDuff v. McDuff 64 that capital increase
from separate property was separate property without reference to the
California statute, 5 which provides that the rents, issues and profits
of separate property are separate property. The question in that case
was whether the gain realized upon the sale of the farm which the hus-
band had purchased before marriage was separate property or com-
965, 966 (1891). Also, it has been held that in Pennsylvania a separate use trust for
a male is impossible; Ylock v. Mangin, 43 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 248 (C. P. Montg. Co.
1927) ; see Bouvier's Estate, 12 Pa. Dist. 149 (0. C. Phila. 1903). However, now that
a separate use trust for a male would have some point, perhaps the rule will be changed.
63. 20 Tax. L. Rav. 542 (1942).
64. 48 Cal. App. 175, 191 Pac. 957 (1920).
65. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 162-163 (Deering, 1941).
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munity property. In holding that the increase in -the farm value was
not community property the court said: 66
". .. it is obvious that the increase in the value of the farm from
the time of the purchase in 1881 to the time of the sale in 1913
was due alone to the natural enhancement of real estate values,
and not to any improvements made thereon through the activity,
ability, or capacity of plaintiff or defendant."
In Louisiana the statute 67 provides that the other spouse is not
entitled to any part of the increase in separate property "if it be proved
that the increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the
rise in the value of property, or to the chances of trade." 68
The definition of separate property in the Texas statute 69 provides
that "the increase of all lands" which are separate property shall be
separate property. The statute contains no provision with regard to
the increase of personal property. The statute does, however, contain
a presumption similar to that contained in Section 3 of the Pennsyl-
vania statute.
The Texas court in Evans v. Purinton 70 stated that the rule ap-
plicable to personal property is different from the rule applicable to land,
as follows: 71
"As applied to land, there is a different rule from that which
obtains as to the profits arising from the purchase and repurchase,
the sale and resale, of goods or personal property, of which the
original stock was purchased with the separate means of the wife.
By our law, the increase of all land the separate property of either
of the spouses(unlike the increase of money or other personal
property) remains the separate property of that spouse."
66. McDuff v. McDuff, 48 Cal. App. 175, 191 Pac. 957 (1920).
67. LA. CIV. CODE, art. 2408 (Dart, 1945).
68. Beals v. Fontenot, 111 F. 2d 956 (C. C. A. 5th 1940), is an estate tax case
where the appellant wife contended that the increase in value of stock which her hus-
band owned prior to his marriage was community property. In denying her conten-
tion, the court wrote as follows at p. 959:
"Appellant concedes as she must that in the usual case of corporate stock, no
reward is due the community because in such cases, the increase of value is cer-
tainly due 'only in the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the value of property,
or to the chances of trade.' She insists though, that by the stipulation in this
case it is 'proved that the increase * * * is the result of the common labor, ex-
penses or industry' within the meaning of Civil Code, Article 2408. Appellee, on
its part, insists that in the case of this stock as in the case of corporate stock in
general, it must be found, as the district court did, that the increase in value of
the stock is due to the efforts of the corporation, the ordinary course of things,
the rise in the value of the property and chances of trade and that there is no rea-
son here to disregard the corporate fiction. ...
"Nothing in the proof takes the case out of the general rule established by
the code that property owned separately before marriage does not through the in-
crease of value after marriage become either as to the original or the increased
value, property of the community."
69. TEx. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, art. 4613, 4614 (Vernon, 1936).
70. 34 S. W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
71. Id. at 352.
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The reason for the foregoing rule was stated to be that the statute
had expressly covered the increase of land and slaves and thus it must
be implied that the increase of other property becomes community
property. 2 The cases so stating, however, were cases involving the
question as to whether calves derived from separate property and cotton
grown on separate property were separate or community property.
These cases may be distinguished on the ground that the calves and
the cotton were income derived from separate property and thus com-
munity property.
The later Texas cases relating to the increases of personalty which
is the separate property of one of the spouses do not discuss these early
cases; those cases hold that such increases are separate property. An
example is Stringfellow v. Sorrells.3  In that case the wife owned as
her separate property two mules worth $35 apiece at her marriage.
Four years later each of the mules was worth $75 and a creditor of her
husband attached them. During the marriage the husband had man-
aged and cared for the mules, and they were fed out of community
property. The creditor argued that the enhanced value of the mules
resulted from the husband's care and feeding of them and that this
increase of the wife's separate estate was community property liable for
his debts. In rendering judgment for the wife, the court wrote as
follows: "
". .. there can be no 'increase' of the wife's separate estate if
composed solely of specific mules at the time of her marriage...
It would tend to entirely destroy the corpus of the wife's estate,
consisting of live personal property, to declare that an augmenta-
tion in weight or value should be deemed an 'increase' of the
property itself so as to constitute a part of the community to that
extent."
In Oglesby v. Potts,5 the court, in discussing the investment of
the proceeds of the wife's separate real and personal property, stated
that it was well settled "that the value due to an appreciated market,
natural growth, increased size, and the like, remains hers, and does not
become part of the community as increase of her property."
Tax cases involving the question whether gain from a spouse's
separate property is separate or community property have concluded
that the Texas decisions make such a gain separate property. 6
72. Howard v. York, 20 Tex. 670 (1858); DeBlane v. Hugh, Lynch & Co., 23
Tex. 25 (1859).
73. 82 Tex. 277, 18 S. W. 689 (1891).
74. Id. at 278-279, 18 S. W. at 689.
75. 40 S. W. 2d 815, 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
76. O'Connor v. Comm'r., 110 F. 2d 652 (C. C. A. 5th 1940), where the profit
from a sale of bonds which were the separate property of a husband domiciled in
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From the later Texas cases and the cases in the Federal courts it
appears that the law of Texas now is to the effect that gain on sepa-
rate property remains separate property and that the statements in the
earlier Texas cases that gain on separate property becomes community
property are not followed. The rule in Texas is particularly applicable
to Pennsylvania because the Texas statute 77 contains the same wording
as Section 3 of the Pennsylvania statute that all property "acquired"
during marriage is community property except that which is defined
as separate property and that all of the effects which the husband and
wife possess at the time the marriage may be dissolved shall be regarded
as "common effects or gains," unless the contrary be satisfactorily
proved. No Texas cases have been found which discuss the effect of
the word "gains" in the Section of the Texas statute quoted above.
Since the Texas statute and the Pennsylvania statute are the same in
this regard, it would seem that the law in Pennsylvania would be that
the gains on the sale of separate property remain separate property,
that is, in the example above, neither the $300 nor the $500 would be
community property but the total $500 would be separate property.
This conclusion does not overlook the fact that the Texas statute 78
expressly provides that the increase of all lands shall be separate prop-
erty, and the fact that the 1939 Oklahoma statute '9 contained a similar
provision which was omitted from Sections 1 and 2 of the 1945
Oklahoma statute."' With regard to Texas, the more recent cases, in
Texas was held taxable to him; Comm'r. v. Skaggs, 122 F. 2d 721, 722 (C. C. A. 5th
1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 811 (1942), where the court discusses the rule in Texas
in the following language:
"In defining the separate property of husband and wife as that owned or
claimed before marriage and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise or descent,
the statutes add 'as also the increase of all lands thus acquired.' Vernon's Ann.
Civ. St. arts. 4613, 4614. The Board following its decision in the case of W. T.
Carter, Jr. v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 853, held the statutory meaning to be
that while any increase in value of separate land realized by a sale would be sepa-
rate property, it would be otherwise as to personal property, because the mention
of increase of land excludes increase of personalty, and the statutes expressly
make to be community property all acquisitions during marriage which are not
separate property. The argument is plausible, but we do not think the construc-
tion is in accord with the Texas decisions. These recognize the identifiable pro-
ceeds of sale of separate property to be separate property, whether the property
sold be real or personal. In O'Connor v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 110 F. 2d 652, we
held the gain on a sale of separate personal property to be taxable to the separate
owner, and cited the Texas decisions from the beginning, affirming the Board's
decision in that case. There are cases in Texas in which it was shown that the
gain realized came largely from the expenditure of the time and efforts of the
spouse during the marriage, in which the claims of the community were recog-
nized, but in such instances the proceeds of the sale were not identified as arising
wholly from the separate property. The Board's case of W. T. Carter, Jr., supra,
was of that kind and was correctly distinguished on that ground in deciding the
O'Connor case, supra, 40 B. T. A. 489. We think the O'Connor case is con-
trolling here."
77. TEx. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, art. 4619, § 1 (Vernon, 1940).
78. Id. at art. 4613, 4614.
79. OKLAHOMA CommuNrry PROPERTY AcT, § 53 (1939).
80. OKLAHOMA CommuNITY PROPERTY AcT, §§ 1, 2 (1945).
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reaching their conclusions, place no reliance upon the fact that the
increase of lands is expressly covered in the statute. With regard to
Oklahoma, at the time the 1945 Oklahoma statute was adopted it
appears that the Texas rule was settled that the increase in separate
property remained separate property. Hence, it can be argued that the
provision with regard to the increase in lands previously contained in
the Oklahoma statute was omitted because it was unnecessary.
8 '
The discussion up to this point deals with gains caused by natural
enhancement of property values, without any contribution of labor
or industry by the husband or wife. Should a gain that is due at least
partly to the labor or industry of the husband or wife be treated as
separate or community property?
Carter v. Commissioner8 held that the gain on the sale of stock
of a Texas corporation managed by the husband was capital gain to the
community. The decision appears to be based on three propositions:
(1) that since some of the shares of stock were acquired as separate
property and some as community property and all were commingled so
that it was impossible to identify any particular shares, it was presumed
that the property was community property; (2) that the husband's
work and efforts in managing the corporation had built up the increase
in value and thus it should be treated as community property; and (3)
that the law in Texas was to the effect that the gain from the sale of
any separate property was community property. The third reason was
said to be erroneous by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Com-
missioner v. Skaggs. The same Circuit Court,"' by concurring in the
conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals, has treated the Carter case as
one where community and separate property were so commingled that
the separate property could not be identified; thus it was presumed that
all of the property was community property. It is difficult to state
the exact status of the reasons given in the Carter case. The case on
which the Board relied for its Texas law in Hayden v. McMillan,5
which was cited for the proposition that where the increase in property
is due to "care, labor, or attention" of the members of the community,
it is community property.8 6 Hayden v. McMillan, however, was a case
construing the Texas statute as to whether rents from the wife's sepa-
81. It can also be argued that Oklahoma changed its statute so as to avoid the
Texas confusion, and hence all gains are community property. However, the argu-
ment advanced in the text seems the better one.
82. 36 B. T. A. 853 (1937).
83. 122 F. 2d 721 (C. C. A. 5th 1941), cert. denied, 315 U. S. 811' (1942).
84. O'Connor v. Comm., 110 F. 2d 652 (C. C. A. 5th 1940).
85. 23 S. W. 430 (Tex. 1893).
86. Louisiana has provided by statute that where the separate property of either
spouse has been increased during marriage, such increase is community property if it
be proved that it resulted from "the common labor, expenses or industry ;", LA. Crv.
CODE, art. 2408 (1945).
36 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
rate property constituted community property. Other Texas cases
dealing with increases due to labor of the spouses are cases in which
separate property has been invested in an unincorporated business in
which one or both the spouses worked.17  In these cases the separate
property was invested in inventory, the inventory sold and new inven-
tory purchased, so that the particular separate property could never be
identified. It is held that since the property has been commingled to
such an extent that identification is impossible, the property is com-
munity property.
88
On the basis of the cases decided to date, it is impossible to predict
the result under the Pennsylvania law. As a matter of theory, the gain
should be allocated between separate property and community property,
based on the property contributed and the value of the service§ ren-
dered.89
"V
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS
A. Construction of the Statute
Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Community Property Act 0 pro-
vides that "that portion of the community property under the manage-
87. Miller v. Marx & Kempner, 65 Tex. 131 (1885) ; Smith v. Bailey, 66 Tex.
553, 1 S. W. 627 (1886); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 80 Tex. 101, 15 S. W. 705 (1891);
Walker-Smith Co. v. Coker, 176 S. W. 2d 1002 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
88. The community, however, is indebted for the value of the separate property
contributed. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 80 Tex. 101, 15 S. W. 705 (1891).
89. Allocation between capital and income is made in states where income from
property is separate property. Van Vorst, 7 T. C. 826; G. C. M. 9825, X-2 Cum.
BULL. 146 (1931). Similar problems are involved where the separate and community
property has been invested in property and the property has been sold at a profit. 3
MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, §§ 19.38, 19A0 (1942).
90. The full text on Sections 7 and 8:
"Section 7. That portion of the community property under the management,
control and disposition of the wife, or which stands in her name, shall be liable
for debts contracted by the wife and for torts of the wife committed in the course
of acquiring, holding or managing such community property, but not otherwise.
That portion of the community property which is under the management, control
and disposition of the husband shall be liable for debts contracted by the husband
and for torts of the husband committed in the course of acquiring, managing,
holding or disposing of the community property, but not otherwise. The husband
and wife and each of them shall be entitled to the exemptions to which they, or
either of them, are entitled under existing laws. All debts created by the husband
or wife after marriage, or after the effective date of this act, whichever is later,
shall be regarded as community debts unless the contrary be satisfactorily proved.
"Section 8. No creditor shall have recourse to the community property for
the payment of debts or liabilities created by either the husband or the wife, ex-
cept as provided in section 7 of this act: Provided, however, That any creditor
may satisfy his claim or demand out of the community property which was under
the management, control and disposition of the spouse incurring the indebtedness
or liability t the time the debt or liability was contracted or created, and which
has been subsequently conveyed or transferred to the other spouse and is under
the management, control and disposition of said other spouse without proof that
said creditor relied upon said community property in advancing said credit, but
without prejudice to the rights of the third party purchasers, encumbrancers or
other creditors or grantees; And provided further, That the husband or wife on
paying community debts shall, as between themselves, charge the same against
community property."
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ment, control, and disposition of the wife, or which stands in her name,
shall be liable for debts contracted by the wife and for torts of the wife
committed in the course of acquiring, holding, or managing such com-
munity property, but not otherwise." As to the husband's debts, the
statute provides that "that portion of the community property which
is under the management, control, and disposition of the husband shall
be liable for debts contracted by the husband and for torts of the hus-
band committed in the course of acquiring, managing, holding, or dis-
posing of the community property, but not otherwise."
The first problem presented by Section 7 is whether all debts
contracted by a spouse may be collected out of the property specified,
or whether only debts contracted in the course of acquiring, holding,
or managing community property may be so collected. Do the words
"in the course of acquiring, holding, or managing" apply to debts
contracted by the spouse, as well as to torts?
Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Act is identical with Section 7 of
the 1945 Oklahoma statute. 1  Section 7 of the Oklahoma statute is a
modification of Section 57 of the 1939 Oklahoma Act,92 which in turn
was patterned after the Texas statute.93 The 1939 Oklahoma Act
provided that the separate property of the spouse, community property
in the name of the spouse, and community property under the control
of the spouse were liable for debts contracted by that spouse and for
any liability arising out of that spouse's torts.9" It was this provision
that led Judge Huxman to dissent in Commissioner v. Harmon when
that case was before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit." Judge Huxman pointed out that under the provisions of the
Oklahoma statute, the husband could by his acts wipe out the entire
interest of the wife, whether those acts were in the interest of the com-
munity or not, and hence the wife could not be said to have a vested
interest. According to Rayburn L. Foster, Esq., who is one of the
draftsmen of the 1945 Oklahoma statute, the seventh section of that
91. OKLAHOMA COMMUNITY PROPERTY AcT, § 7 (1945).
92. OKLAHOMA COMMUNITY PROPERTY ACT, § 57 (1939), reads as follows:
"Sec. 57. The separate property of the wife and that portion of community
property, record title to which is in her name or which is under the management,
control and disposition of the wife, shall be subject to debts contracted by the wife
or liabilities of the wife arising out of tort, or otherwise, but not to debts or liabli-
ties of the husband. The separate property of the husband and that portion of the
community property, record title to which is in his name or which is under the
management, control and disposition of the husband shall be subject to debts con-
tracted by the husband or liabilities of the husband arising out of tort or other-
wise, but not the debts or liabilities of the wife. The husband and the wife, and
each of them, shall be entitled to the exemptions to which they, or either of them,
are now entitled under the laws existing prior to the enactment of this Act."
93. For a comparison of the Texas and Oklahoma statutes, see page 18 of the re-
spondent's brief in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44 (1944).
94. See note 92 supra.
95. 139 F. 2d 211 (C. C. A. 10th 1943).
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statute was intended to meet Judge Huxman's objection so far as
torts are concerned, but not so far as contract debts are concerned. On
this point Mr. Foster has written as follows: 9
"In administering a community estate and paying community
debts, the question will naturally arise as to what are community
debts. What debts will be paid by the survivor out of the com-
munity property and what debts will be left for payment by the
administrator of the deceased's estate? In the 1939 Act (Sec. 57,
Tit. 32, Okla. Stat. 1941), it was provided that that portion of
the community property, record title to which is in the wife's
name or which is under her management, control or disposition,
shall be subject to the debts of the wife, whether created by her
contract or tort. A correlative provision was made with respect
to debts of the husband. In the 1945 Statute, this provision was
changed only insofar as it applies to torts.. While under the 1939
Act the community property in the hands of the wife and husband,
respectively, was liable 'for their individual torts, the 1945 Act
provides that it shall be liable only for torts committed in the
course of acquiring, holding, or managing the community prop-
erty; in other words, torts for which a true partnership would be
liable. This change was made in order to meet the objection of
Judge Huxman of the Circuit Court of Appeals, in his dissenting
opinion in the Harmon case, 139 Fed. 2d 211, 216, wherein he
concluded that while the decision in that case should be governed
by Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 75 L. Ed. 239, the Oklahoma
Act did not meet the requirements of that case because the wife
did not have a vested interest in the community estate. Judge
Huxman pointed out that under the provisions of Section 57 of
Title 32 it was possible for all of the community property in the
hands of the husband to be taken and sold for the personal debts
of the husband and from this he concluded that the wife's interest
was not vested. While it was not thought that this was a valid
objection in view of the statutes and decisions of other states
whose community property laws were recognized by the Supreme
Court, it was sought to obviate this objection insofar as it applied
to torts."
Thus the statutory history in Oklahoma indicates that the words fol-
lowing "in the course of" modify only the word "torts" and do not
apply to contract debts.
It has been suggested that the punctuation of the first two sen-
tences of Section 7 and the substance of the last sentence of that section
indicate that community property is liable only for debts contracted by
a spouse in the course of dealing with community property.97 So far as
96. Foster, Probating a Community Property Estate, 17 OxIA. B. A. J. 664, 670
(No. 17).
97. Hamilton, Oklahoma Community Property Law as It Affects Operation and
Managenment of Savings and Loan Associations, 16 OXLA. B. A. J. 1077, 1084 (No. 27).
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punctuation is concerned, it plays little, if any, part in the construction
of Pennsylvania statutes.17 1 So far as the last sentence of the section
is concerned, it merely creates a presumption that debts incurred after
the start of the community are community debts, and it is difficult to
see how this sheds any light on the problem under consideration. A
more helpful clue to the meaning of the first two sentences is their
syntax. Each sentence says that community property "shall be liable
for debts . . . and for torts . . ." The repetition of the word "for"
is highly significant. It shows that everything following the second
"for" is to be linked directly with the word "liable", and is not to apply
to the word "debts contracted" since they are between the first "for"
and the second "for".
Under the Spanish law community property was liable only for
community debts.98 This rule has been adopted in Washington " and
Arizona. 0 0 However, Texas, from which the Penfisylvania statute is
derived, has held that separate debts may be collected out of community
property.'
It may be concluded that all debts contracted by a spouse may be
collected out of community property under the control of that spouse
or standing in that spouse's name, and that the limitations contained
in the statute apply only to torts.0 2 In all of the following discussion
it is assumed that community property under the management and
control of the spouse or which stands in that spouse's name is liable for
all debts contracted by that spouse.
B. Debts Existing at the Start of the Community
In stating what property shall be liable for debts, Section 7 does
not specifically limit the word "debts" to those contracted after the start
of the community. Does the Section apply to debts contracted prior
to that time? Since Section 7 refers to debts without any reference
to the time when they were incurred, it would seem reasonable to
conclude that a debt contracted before the start of the community could
be collected out of community property which is under the control or
which stands in the name of the spouse contracting the debt.
97a. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 553 (Purdon, 1938).
98. MATIENZO, GLOSS Vii, No. 2, TO Nov. REc. LAW 2; GiTIERRmZ, QUAESTIO
cxxix, No. 1, To Nov. REc. LAw 9; Spain: NOVIsIMA RECOPILAcIoN, Book 10, Title
11, Law 2.
99. Shuey v. Holmes, 20 Wash. 13, 54 Pac. 540 (1898).
100. McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 74 P. 2d 1181 (1938) ; see Forsythe v.
Paschal, 34 Ariz. 380, 271 Pac. 865 (1928).
101. Cleveland v. Cole, 65 Tex. 402 (1886).
102. The exemption given by the courts to property held as tenants by the entire-
ties from the claims of creditors of either spouse would seem to be inapplicable be-
cause those cases are based on the theory that each tenant holds the entire property.
Under the Community Property Act, each member of the community is "vested with
an undivided one-half interest therein."
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Under the Spanish law, ante-nuptial debts could not be collected
out of community property.' In Texas 104 and California, 5 however,
such debts may be collected out of community property. Since the
Pennsylvania Act in part is derived from the Texas law, it would seem
that its rule would be followed and that such debts would be collectible
out of community property.
C. Definition of Community Debts
The last sentence of Section 7 of the Act provides that all debts
created by the husband or wife after marriage or the effective date of
the Act, whichever is later, shall be regarded as community debts unless
the contrary be satisfactorily proved. The importance of determining
whether a debt created by contract is a community debt or a separate
debt arises only on the death of one spouse or on divorce. During the
lifetime of both spouses, a debt contracted by one can only be enforced
against his or her separate property and the community property
under his or her control or standing in his or her name. Under Section
15 of the Act, on death all community debts are to be paid out of
community property. Thus a community debt at that time can be paid
not only from the community property under the control or standing
in the name of the spouse who contracted the debt,, but also out of the
community property in the control or standing in the name of the other
spouse. On divorce, Section 10 provides that the husband and wife
shall each be vested with an undivided interest in the community prop-
erty as tenants in common. The Act contains no express provision,
similar to Section 15 relating to death, that on divorce community
property is to be used to pay community debts. However, before any
community property could be vested in each spouse as tenants in com-
mon, all community debts should be paid.
Community debts are debts contracted by either the husband or
the wife for the benefit of -the community, as for example where the
proceeds of the transaction creating the debt are used to produce in-
come for the community, or the debt is incurred to protect community
property or is contracted in the ordinary course of business."0 6
103. Spain: FUERO REAL, Book 3, Title 20, Law 14.
104. Taylor v. Murphy, 50 Tex. 291 (1878).
105. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308 (1860).
106. Abbott v. Wetherby, 6 Wash. 507, 33 Pac. 107 (1893) ; Godefroy v. Hupp,
93 Wash. 371, 160 Pac. 1056 (1916) (liability for broker's commission on sale of
community property is a community debt) ; Davidson v. Click, 31 N. M. 543, 249 Pac.
100 (1926) (liability for purchase price of property is a community debt). Would
husband's liability as surety for a third person be a debt contracted by the husband?
Such a debt would probably be held to be based on contract. See Sections 40, 65, 66,
67 and 68 of Act of May 16, 1901, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, §§ 92, 156-160 (Purdon,
1930). Cf. Payne v. Williams, 47 Ariz. 396, 56 P. 2d 186 (1936) (endorsement of a note
only for accommodation and not for the benefit of the community is a separate debt) ;
Peterson v. Zimmerman, 142 Wash. 385, 253 Pac. 642 (1927) (in a suit on a note
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The last sentence of Section 7 of the Act states a presumption that
all debts created are presumed to be community debts unless the con-
trary be satisfactorily proved. With that presumption, there will be
few debts created by contract which are separate debts.
Obligations created by reason of torts committed in connection
with specific acts with regard to community property as specified in
the statute would be collectible during lifetime out of the community
property under the control of or in the name of the spouse committing
the tort. Other torts committed by the spouse would be collectible
only out of the separate property of the spouse committing the tort and
not out of community property. The liability of that separate property
would, of course, continue after dissolution of the community for such
torts as are then enforceable. However, a question arises as to whether
the community property in the hands of the other spouse could be used
to satisfy the liability for such torts. Does the presumption that all
debts are community debts apply to (1) torts committed in connection
with the community property and (2) other torts? The act, in the
first part of Section 7, makes a distinction between debts and torts,
and then in the last sentence, stating the presumption, merely states
that "all debts" shall be regarded as community debts. Does this mean
that only contract debts are to come within the presumption, or is it
also to apply to liabilities for torts? Ordinarily the word "debts" does
not include an unliquidated tort claim.1"7 The di'stinction in the statute
itself and this general rule lead to the 'conclusion that the presumption
does not apply to torts. Therefore, in the case of torts, it is necessary to
prove affirmatively that the torts were committed in the course of deal-
ing with community property in order to collect them from the com-
munity property.
Torts committed in the course of acquiring, holding, or managing
community property would include torts committed in taking posses-
sion of the community property, 08 torts in connection with an attempt
to protect community property, 0 9 and making secret profits in buying
property for a third person." 0  Likewise, false representations by the
husband in conducting a corporate real estate business, of which he is
the manager and in which the community holds one-third of the stock,
signed by the husband, the community may show that it was signed as an accommoda-
tion, that the community received no benefit from it, and that therefore the community
is not liable on it) ; Sun Life Ass. Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P. 2d 1110 (1933)
(the husband's endorsement of a note to assist his daughter and son-in-law without
aiding the community, is not a community debt).
107. Hollidaysburg Borough v. Snyder, 258 Pa. 206, 101 Atl. 955 (1917); see
Moorehead's Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 AtI. 802 (1927).
108. Geissler v. Geissler, 96 Wash. 150, 164 Pac. 746 (1917).
109. McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 74 P. 2d 1181 (1938).
110. McGregor v. Johnson, 58 Wash. 78, 107 Pac. 1049 (1910).
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give rise to community liability."' However, torts of a spouse acting
in his or her capacity as a public official are not community torts.
1 12
Nor may community property be subjected to the satisfaction of a
judgment for costs rendered in favor of a state in a criminal action
against the husband for arson of community property." 3  A tort
liability incurred in the use of a family car for purposes 'of one spouse
without the kiowledge or consent of the other spouse is not a com-
munity debt." 4 Moreover, it has been held that the fact that the com-
munity is not benefited does not prevent the tort from being a
community liability." 5
Can a debt incurred prior to the start of the community be a com-
munity debt? If so, a debt existing at that time, if it qualifies as a
community debt, could be enforced not only against the separate prop-
erty of the spouse contracting the debt and the community property
under his or her control or standing in his or her name but also, on
death or divorce, out of the community property under the control bf
or standing in the name of the other spouse. In other words, for a hus-
band's debt, the wife's savings out of income from her separate property
or earnings could on the death of the husband or upon divorce be
taken by the creditor to pay his debt. It would seem that if the debt
in existence at the start of the community was incurred in a transaction
out of which income was being produced, or was incurred in protecting
property which prodtuced income (assuming that the income or the
property was community property), or otherwise benefited the mar-
riage, the debt would be a community debt. If this rule is applied by
the courts, a mortgage on the house in which the spouses live, where
the husband alone is liable on the bond, would be a community debt
and on the death of the husband could be enforced against all com-
munity property, whether under his control or that of the wife.
If a husband borrows money for a separate purpose and the wife
signs a note making the husband and the wife jointly and severally
liable, does the debt become a community debt merely because both
husband and wife are liable for the debt? The test as to whether a
debt is separate or community does not depend on who is liable for
it, but whether it benefits the community. Here by hypothesis the debt
111. Wimmer v. Nicholson, 151 Wash. 199, 275 Pac. 699 (1929).
112. Kies v. Wilkinson, 114 Wash. 89, 194 Pac. 89 (1921) ; Brotton v. Langert, 1
Wash. 73, 23 Pac. 688 (1890). These decisions are questionable, since acting as pub-
lic officer produced community income and a tort in connection with such duties should
be a community liability.
113. Bergman v. State of Washington, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P. 2d 699 (1936).
114. Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 Pac. 425 (1930). Suppose an accident
occurs while husband and wife are using a car for pleasure or wife is using it for shop-
ping or husband is using it for pleasure with knowledge and consent of wife. All
torts so committed should be community liabilities.
115. McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 74 P. 2d 1181 (1938).
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did not benefit the community and hence would ,not be a community
debt but would be the separate debt of the wife and of the husband.
As against community creditors the joint liability of the husband and
wife does not of itself make the debt a community debt." 6 Of course,
in the example given above the creditor could during the lifetime
of both spouses reach all property, whether separate or community,
because of the joint and several liability of the spouses; but after the
death of either spouse he could not reach community property.
D. Partnerships
Will loans to partnerships be affected by the Community Property
Act? It often occurs in partnerships that income will be left in the
partnership and added to a partner's capital; such income will now be
in part the property of the wife and in part the property of the husband.
Does this addition of income to capital affect such loans? Under Sec-
tion 40 of the Uniform Partnership Act, "I partnership property is
subject to the payment of partnership debts before it can be reached
by the separate creditors of any partner. Under that section of the
Act, it would appear that a loan to a partnership would have to be
paid before the partner's interest in the firm is computed. The rein-
vestment of community, income in the partnership would not affect the
payment of such a debt but would affect the persons who were entitled
to take what was left of the partner's interest in the partnership after
his death.
Since loans to partnerships would always be in connection with
a business, such loans would constitute community debts.
E. Use of Community Property to Pay Separate Debts
The last proviso of Section 8 of the Act states that the husband
or wife, on paying community debts, shall, as between themselves,
charge the same to community property. Under that section of the
Act, if separate property is used by either spouse to pay a community
debt, the spouse whose property is so used would be entitled to reim-
bursement for the amount so used upon dissolution of the community.
Although the use of separate property to pay community debts is
expressly covered by the Act, there is no provision covering the use
of community property to pay separate debts. Under the construction
which has been given to Section 7 of the Act, it is possible for com-
munity property to be used to pay a separate debt contracted by a
spouse. The Pennsylvania courts will undoubtedly follow the Texas
116. In Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 Pac. 613 (1919), a husband signed and
delivered a note endorsed by his wife, which was a renewal of a similar note given
them before marriage. The court held the debt was not a community debt, but the
separate debt of each.
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 102 (Purdon, 1930).
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courts on this point, and in Texas the rule is that a spouse who uses
community property to improve separate property must account for
that property on a dissolution of the partnership."' Under the law
of Texas, if community property is used to improve separate property,
a right of reimbursement to the extent of one-half of the amount so
used arises in the other spouse. If the property improved is real
property, the right of reimbursement does not become an interest
in the real estate. The amount to be recovered is to be paid out of
separate property, but if such property is insufficient, then the land
improved may be sold and the proceeds distributed. Moreover, the
amount of recovery under the right of reimbursement is limited to the
enhancement of the property by reason of the improvements out of
community property at the time of its division. The same rules were
applied in the Spanish law." 9
It would seem that the rules just stated would be applicable under
the Pennsylvania Act not only because it in part comes from the
Texas statute but also because, as a matter of fairness, the spouse
should not be permitted to use community property to improve separate
property without accounting for the property so used. Of course, if
it could be shown that the other spouse consented to that use, then no
accounting would be necessary.
F. Transfers Between Spouses
Section 8 of the Act permits a creditor to satisfy his claim or
demand out of community property which was under the management,
control, and disposition of the spouse incurring the indebtedness or
liability at the time it was contracted or created and was subsequently
conveyed or transferred to the other spouse; and the creditor may
do this without first proving that he relied upon the community
property in advancing credit. However, the creditor's right in this
regard will not be enforced so as to prejudice the rights of third party
purchasers, encumbrancers, or other creditors or grantees. Thus a
creditor may reach property which was owned by the spouse at the
time the debt was created but which has been subsequently transferred
to the other spouse. A spouse cannot remove property from the reach
of a creditor merely by transferring it to the other member of the
community.
118. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S. W. 2d 620 (1935).
119. Asso AND MANUEL, INSTITUTES OF CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN, Book I, Title VII,
§ 2, cap. 5 provides: "That the loss or injury caused to the real estate (hacienda) by
reason of the husband having rented it out at a low rate or price, or having paid annui-
ties (censos) or debts for an illicit cause ought not to prejudice the wife; and there-
fore in these cases the amount of loss or injury must be deducted from the mass of
property and given to the wife before dividing the property." See also MATIENZo,
GLOss vir, No. 6, TO Nov. RFc. LAW 2 and GLoss rr, No. 2, TO Nov. REc. LAW 3.
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G. Bankruptcy
A trustee in bankruptcy 120 becomes entitled to not only property
which the bankrupt can transfer but also to property "which might
have been levied upon or sold under judicial process against" the
bankrupt or "otherwise seized, impounded or sequestered." 121 For
this reason, the trustee in bankruptcy acquires all property which could
be disposed of by the bankrupt and which could be reached by the bank-
rupt's creditors; and in determining whether such a trustee for a spouse
can secure any or all of the community property, it is necessary to know
whether any or all of such property is subject to the bankrupt spouse's
debts under the state law.
122
Thus, on bankruptcy of one spouse the trustee in bankruptcy may
reach the bankrupt's separate property and also that part of the com-
munity property under the control of or standing in the bankrupt's
name. Community property under the control of the other spouse
may not be reached.'23
H. Application of Community Property Act to Various Loan Trans-
actions
The application of the Community Property Act to various loan
transactions may be summarized as follows:
1. Unsecured Loans
(a) Debts created by the husband after September 1, 1947. Dur-
ing the life of the borrower such an indebtedness may be collected out
of his separate property or out of the community property under his
control, disposition or management or which stands in his name. On
the death of the borrower if the debt is a community debt, it will then
be the obligation of the surviving spouse to pay the debt out of com-
munity property (which will include the community property under the
control, disposition and management of the husband and also the com-
120. It has been held that the community property must be considered in deter-
mining whether one spouse was solvent or insolvent, since the word "property" as
used in Section 1(19) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, as amended, is not limited to
property available to pay the bankrupt's debts. See Lasswell v. Stein-Block Co., Inc.,
93 F. 2d 322 (C. C. A. 5th 1937). For a general discussion see Moore, The Com-
munity Property System and Bankruptcy, 11 WAsH. L. Rxv. 61'(1936).
121. Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, June 22, 1938, 30 STAT. 565,
as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 110 (1940).
122. Thus, property held as tenants by the entireties is not subject to the debts of
each spouse and cannot be reached by the trustee in bankruptcy. Lunnen v. Hunter,
348 Pa. 402, 35 A. 2d 292 (1944) ; Keirin v. Palumbo, 60 F. 2d 480 (C. C. A. 3rd
1932).
123. Cases holding that the community may be declared bankrupt would seem to
have no application under the Pennsylvania Act. Strong v. Eakin, 11 N. M. 107, 66
Pac. 593 (1901) ; cf. In re Wallace, 22 F. 2d 171 (E. D. Wash. 1927) ; Smedberg v.
Bevilockwaz, 7 Cal. App. 2d 578, 46 P. 2d 820 (1935).
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munity 'property under the control, disposition and management of
the wife), or if that is insufficient, the executor or administrator of the
borrower can be required to pay it out of the separate property of the
borrower. On the other hand, if the debt is a separate debt, it will
not be payable out of the community property but only out of the
separate property of the borrower, which of course would include the
balance of his one-half interest in the community property after the
community debts were paid. Thus lending institutions will probably
require both the husband and wife to be made jointly and severally
liable. The effect of the husband and wife being jointly and severally
liable would probably not be to convert a separate debt into a com-
munity debt but at least such liability would permit the lender to
proceed against the 50% interest in the community property which
passes to the spouse of the borrower after the payment of community
debts.
(b) Debts of the husband existing prior to September 1, 1947.
During the life of the borrower such an indebtedness may be collected
out of his separate property or out of the community property under
his control, disposition or management or which stands in his name.
On the death of the borrower such a debt would probably be a separate
debt unless it benefits the community through the production of income
or the protection of property, in which case what has been said under
(a) above would apply. On each renewal by a married person of any
indebtedness existing on September 1, 1947, lenders will probably insist
that both husband and wife should sign the evidence of indebtedness.
2. Secured Loans
(a) Secured by Stocks and Bonds. Stocks and bonds registered
in the name of the borrowing husband would be either his separate
property or community property under his management, control and
disposition, and they could be validly pledged by him as security for a
loan without his wife being required to join in the pledge. With
respect to such security, the rights of the lender would be the same
today as they were prior to September 1, 1947. If the security were
insufficient, the borrower's obligation could be enforced, during his life-
time, against his separate property and against community property
under his control, disposition or management, or standing in his name.
Whether after the death of the borrower the obligation could be en-
forced as a community debt depends on how the proceeds had been
used. What has been stated under 1 (a) and (b) above as to separate
and community debts applies here.
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(b) Secured by Accounts Receivable, Warehouse Receipts, Trust
Receipts, Bailment Leases, Chattel Mortgages, etc. arising out of or
connected with Business Property. The situation with respect to the
foregoing types of property is the same as that set forth in the im-
mediately preceding paragraph (a). In addition, such a secured
obligation could, whether or not the borrower was living, be enforced
against community property because the obligation would be considered
a community debt in view of its having been incurred in connection
with a business operation which gives rise to community income.
(c) Secured by Warehouse Receipts, Chattel Mortgages, Bail-
ment Leases connected with Non-business Property. The borrower
has the right to pledge such property if it is either his individual prop-
erty or property which is under his control. Such a pledge is in the
same category as the pledges referred to in 2 (a) and (b) above. The
rights of the bank to proceed against property other than that pledged
are the same as those set forth on paragraphs 1 (a) and (b).
3. Loans to Partnerships
Since a loan to a partnership made after September 1, 1947 would
constitute a community debt, it could be collected during the lifetime
of the partner out of the partnership assets, the separate property of
the partner, and the community property under the control, disposition
and management of the partner. After the partner's death, it could
also be collected out of all community property, including that under
the control of the wife. Debts existing on September 1, 1947 would
constitute community debts since such debts were created for the pro-
duction of income. The creditor's remedy would be the same as in the
case of debts created after September 1, 1947. However, until this
question is settled by the courts, it may be that lending institutions will
require the obligation of the wife on any renewal of such debts.
4. Loans to Individual Proprietors
What has been said under 1 and 2 above with regard to unsecured
and secured loans applies to loans to individual proprietors.
(To be Continued)
